China’s counter-drone tactics

A video released by China’s CCTV news channel on or around the 11th April, has revealed something of the way the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) is thinking about the counter-drone fight. The video is highly choreographed, which is quite typical of the PLA; its outputs are designed to show what the military is doing, conveying messages both domestically and abroad. Nevertheless, it provides yet more evidence that the PLAGF is observing the development of drones and establishing counter-measures designed to minimise exposure of its forces to them. The video shows two key areas of defence: Passive, with several types of shelter designed to guard against FPVs, and active with hard kill and soft kill weapons deployed against drones. 

Active counter-drone tactics

The video shows several active counter-drone tactics using a range of weapons. The implication is that the PLAGF is working to understand those weapons that work the best, or considering a layered set of personal weapons at the squad level. 

1. The shotgun: One element of the video shows a soldier armed with what appears to be a QBS-09 semi-automatic 12 gauge shotgun. He successfully engages a small quadcopter at relatively close range. The QBS-09 has been around for a while and is likely finding new applications in the counter-drone space. 12 gauge shotguns are regularly used in Ukraine and the Middle East for defence against small drones and do appear to be somewhat effective. However, there is a growing market for new cartridges designed specifically to destroy FPVs, like the Norma Anti-Drone Long Effective Range (AD-LER).
2. The drone net: Another clip shows a soldier firing a net from a shoulder-fired weapon that snares a small drone, bringing it to the ground. This system would presumably have a shorter range even than the QBS-09, which is likely to have a range of around 30 m or less, depending on the weight of shot used. It stands to reason that the net solution would be high risk compared to a shotgun, and so may be intended for the purpose of capturing drones. 
3. The final interception method was a counter-drone jammer, which appears to be the Anti-drone gun from Hinaray. It was used to bring a small hovering quadcopter down. This type of system is valuable, but it could be argued that they are losing their edge as more drones are built with resilient navigation and communications channels. Or, as is the case in Ukraine, with unjammable fibre-optic control links. Hinaray claims its anti-drone gun has a range up to 1,500 m, and works across 433MHz, 900MHz, and various signals up to 5.2 GHz, which would cover most of the frequencies used by small drones. 

China is increasing its production and use of counter-drone weapons, with the Chinese Communist Party even urging the country’s industry to focus on them. The selection of effectors shown in the video will likely grow and mature as a result, leading to improved efficacy for infantry sections during a drone defence. Of the three effectors shown, the shotgun appears most suitable and effective. Rifle sights like the SMASH sight from Smart Shooter are also important additions for western forces, as they help the shooter track and accurately engage a target. They are, however, quite expensive – the British Army procured 225 in 2023 at a contract value of £4.6 million – around £20,000 per sight. 

Passive counter-drone tactics 

The passive counter-drone measures shown in the video seem to assume a static war with soldiers located in trenches and dug-outs. During the exercise, they deployed various drills to either prevent FPVs from hitting them, or seeing them. 

1. A dug-out door: This clip of the video shows a soldier entering a dug-out before pulling a screen made of rebar into place over the doorway. Shortly after, an FPV slams into the metal frame, seemingly demonstrating its effectiveness. This type of defence would certainly be valuable, smaller systems that are lightweight may lack the payload to carry a munition that can destroy the grate or harm those inside. However, the size of the grating would likely be critical as small bombs could likely make their way through the holes shown in the PLAGF video. This experience has been echoed by Russian engineers building counter-drone tunnels out of netting in Ukraine. 
2. Cloth screens: Another training scenario appears to show a small quadcopter drone deploying an explosive munition over a trench. In response, the soldiers in the trench system pull a cloth over the top of the trench, presumably for camouflage. This is unlikely to prevent the explosive from causing harm – assuming that it detonates – but would serve to provide camouflage, which can complicate detection from a drone. 
3. Mud barriers: In the final scenario, a soldier rolls behind a pre-constructed mud barrier in time to avoid the blast of a smoke grenade dropped from a drone. The barrier was just high enough for his body to be fully concealed, and would likely protect against some of the smaller effects deployed by drones, likely necessitating a move to avoid follow-on attacks afterwards. 

Most of these measures seem relatively sensible as a means to improve survivability against small drones and FPVs for infantry. Similar adjustments have been observed in different areas of Ukraine, although presumably as a frontline innovation, rather than as a result of training as this video appears to show. 

These defences would also rely on the logistics being available to carry those materials into place, which is not always guaranteed. One of the primary challenges of drones and FPVs in Ukraine is that they are used to interdict supply routes. Typically, there are only a few roads into and out of a position which enables drones to effectively saturate those areas and potentially isolate units. Of course, all of these defences require the soldiers to have adequate warning and awareness that there are threats nearby. 

Moreover, all of these defences would have to contend with the conventional weapons that would continue to play central roles in future conflicts. Artillery will quickly shred and destroy cloth camouflage, for instance, and reshape terrain and shelters. 

Calibre comment 

The first line of counter-drone defence is, or should be, layered electronic warfare and short-range air defence providing defensive envelopes that are able to intercept the larger fixed wing drones like the Russian Orlan-10, and jam or destroy smaller reconnaissance systems as necessary. However, unless those systems have a line of sight to the drones in question, it will become essential for infantry to address the threats as a last line of defence. That is essentially what the PLAGF exercise shows, multiple layered options designed to defeat small drones, or minimise the risk that they pose. 

Overall, the video is not particularly useful in assessing the PLAGF’s response to small drones writ large. With a total of one million personnel in service, or around that, it is a variable organisation with different standards of equipment and training. This is occasionally deliberate; units in the Eastern Theatre Command facing Taiwan, might not need the same heavy equipment as the Western Theatre Command facing India, for example. With that, the video and its wider implications should be viewed with caution, but it does, nonetheless, show that the PLAGF is thinking about the challenges of drones and modern warfare. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on 14th April, 2025. 

The video

You can find the full video below, reposted by @jesusfroman on X.com. Jesus is a good source for the latest updates on the PLAGF and worth following if this subject is of interest to you. 

A🇨🇳PLAGF unit special infantry Anti-FPV UAVs drill where different defensive methods were trained: From direct engages with shotguns&thrown nets,to active visual&steel mesh protection combined with trench systems,not only against OWA UAVs,but also dropped charges
(wb/沉默的山羊) pic.twitter.com/Us2wHjZtAG

— Jesus Roman (@jesusfroman) April 12, 2025