Arming Ukraine, a review of Europe’s pledges for 2025

As Ukraine marks the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion, European states have re-emphasised their support through additional donations and pledges of equipment. Where do these latest promises leave Ukraine? Sam Cranny-Evans examines some of the announcements and their impact. 

As the political situation in the US has shifted and aid for Ukraine has come into doubt, the European nations have stepped in to fill the vacuum left by the US. Aid packages announced since late January and on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion point to a robust effort to equip and support Ukraine throughout 2025. The EU is preparing a military aid package including ammunition, vehicles, air defence systems and various other platforms, that will be valued at EUR20 billion according to a Bloomberg report citing an unnamed source. Spain has also pledged an additional EUR1 billion in aid, which appears from the available reporting to be separate to the EU effort. This is, and the many other packages announced since January are undoubtedly invaluable for Ukraine, however, one Ukrainian officer did indicate to Calibre that without US aid the war would end quickly. 

There are some indications that US aid will return, with President Trump declaring that a deal providing the US with 50% of the revenues from any monetisation of Ukraine’s state-owned mineral reserves would go to the US. In return, Ukraine will get “lots of military equipment, and the right to fight on” in Trump’s words. Pending that agreement and the delivery of US weapons and ammunition, it is worthwhile examining the available information on European donations since January, they are revealing in both the scale and determination of support. Overall, it seems as though Europe’s support will be sufficient to shore up Ukraine’s defences, at least in a material sense, throughout 2025. 

Ammunition

It seems obvious, but ammunition is an absolutely essential requirement of Ukraine’s war. Without western support and supplies of ammunition, the front would look very different today, if the war had not already ended. Because of this, large aid packages like Sweden’s EUR1.14 billion aid package announced at the end of January are critical. It included more than a million rounds of 12.7 mm ammunition, 1,400 TOW missiles and 200 AT4 anti-tank missile launchers. Around EUR90 million was allocated for the production of long-range drones and missiles, and EUR177 million followed the Danish model, which can be used to invest in the Ukrainian defence industry. Canada is also expected to provide millions of rounds of ammunition, and many of the other donor countries detailed below, are also providing ammunition to keep Ukraine in the fight. However, as recently reported by RUSI, the ammunition situation for Ukraine is desperate, particularly for large calibre artillery munitions which are seen as essential to countering Russias’s artillery and supporting offensive operations. A significant surge in artillery ammunition would certainly help Ukraine, perhaps disproportionately to some of the other capabilities on offer. Estonia has made it clear that it would buy 10,000 additional rounds of artillery ammunition in 2025, but that could approximate to only a few days of fighting. 

Artillery

Denmark operates an interesting model of support for Ukraine, whereby it procures equipment from Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, which both provides weapons and ammunition for Ukraine, and supports Ukrainian society by providing employment. In early 2025, it agreed EUR538 million worth of orders with the country’s defence companies, which includes additional orders for the Boghdana self-propelled howitzer upon Ukraine’s request. Further orders have been placed for long-range strike drones and anti-tank missiles. The UK and Sweden also finalised an approximately EUR15 million package to repair the Archer howitzers donated by Sweden in Ukraine. That work will be led by a British company called AMS. This builds on a January 2025 contract signed between the British Government and Sheffield Forgemasters for the production of 155 mm artillery barrels. 

Ukraine has already received hundreds of howitzers from the West and will receive more in the coming year in the form of the Boxer RCH155. However, as is the case for armoured vehicles, one of the primary challenges is maintaining those vehicles in a serviceable condition. Each requires a different type of barrel, many of those barrels are firing more rounds in a day than they might ever fire in a year of service with a western army. This is but one element of maintaining the guns, there is also the question of ammunition and charges as already discussed. Nevertheless, Ukraine is making good use of its artillery systems, and western munitions like the Bonus anti-armour round are proving their worth in degrading Russia’s armoured formations when they occasionally gather for an offensive. So, while there are no significant announcements of additional artillery systems, the focus on maintenance and support could be a welcome sign that Ukraine’s artillery park will be supported and possibly replenished in the coming year. 

Drones

The defence tech company Helsing announced that it was building 6,000 of its HX-2 drones for Ukraine in Europe, on top of 4,000 slightly less capable drones that were already being manufactured in Ukraine. Moreover, the UK confirmed in its announcement that it was on track to provide more than 10,000 drones inside of a single year with delivery set to complete in March. Other large tranches of funding have been announced that will likely include funding for drones and long-range precision strike assets. The Helsing drones, if they are well-employed, could provide a real boost to Ukraine’s tactical forces. They are similar to the Russian Lancet, which is responsible for many of Ukraine’s artillery and armoured fighting vehicle losses. More than 3,000 Lancets have been deployed along the frontline and they have become a key element of Russia’s counter-battery doctrine. Ukraine does not appear to have had a scalable response or equivalent to this capability, so the introduction of the HX-2 could genuinely alter Ukraine’s fortunes if it succeeds. 

Armoured vehicles 

The UK has found and modernised an unknown quantity of T-72 main battle tanks, which will be deployed to Ukraine along with some other armoured vehicles by the end of spring. The total number of additional vehicles donated by the UK in this round is in excess of 50. Canada is also set to provide 25 LAV III 8×8 armoured fighting vehicles and two armoured combat support vehicles. There are also rumours, as yet unconfirmed, that Italy is supplying Centauro B1 8×8 vehicles which are armed with a 105 mm main gun. 

A more concrete commitment was made by Denmark, which announced around EUR268 million in funding to train and equip a Ukrainian brigade in cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic countries. This will include the necessary ammunition, but it is not clear what vehicles and equipment will be provided. however. Latvia also pledged 42 of the Patria Common Armoured Vehicle Systems (CAVS), which it is building domestically, in the coming year with more support to follow. Finland has also promised EUR660 million in military equipment without specifying what would be supplied, only indicating that it would order this round of equipment from its domestic manufacturers, indicating a possible role for Patria – especially if Finland intends to support the brigade that will be trained by the Nordic states. 

These vehicles will come in addition to others ordered in the course of 2024, like the CV90s procured in a joint deal between Sweden and Denmark. Armoured vehicles remain essential, despite what the prevalence of drone videos on social media might lead you to believe. Vehicles like the T-72 are used to provide indirect fire support, which is very effective because of the speed of the rounds and how well-protected the vehicle is. Others, like the Centauro if it is provided, could prove very useful in urban environments or during offensives, providing fire support for Ukrainian infantry. The question really is whether there are enough, although the emphasis in many announcements on the provision of maintenance in 2025 indicates that there may be many vehicles still in service that can be returned to a serviceable state. 

Air defence 

Air defence has been a constant concern since day one of the invasion. Without tactical air defences like the Buk-M1, Russian drones are able to range freely up to 150 km behind the frontline seeking high value targets for the Iskander ballistic missile. Ukraine has received thousands of air defence missiles and dozens of systems, which provide the vital protection for its cities and critical infrastructure. However, Russia’s strikes in March and April 2024 were effective and degraded the country’s energy generation and distribution networks. Moreover, Su-34s with glide bombs are able to range with some impunity close to the frontline, destroying Ukrainian strong points and inflicting heavy casualties. 

Meeting Ukraine’s needs has proven challenging. The West’s missile supply chain has taken time to respond to the increased demand and at times, the lack of interceptors has opened Ukraine’s forces to extensive strikes from Russia’s recce-strike contour. In response to this need, the UK is providing the Gravehawk “frankenSAM”, which leverages a modular launcher mounted on a truck or high mobility vehicle and armed with two repurposed R-73 air-to-air missiles that Ukraine is understood to have had large stockpiles of at the start of the war. The project has been undertaken by the UK and Denmark and will provide Ukraine with 15 Gravehawks, the UK’s commitment overall will support more than 100 air defence teams, according to the British Government announcement on the 12th February. Lithuania has pledged additional unspecified air defence and counter-drone capabilities under a EUR80 million aid package, as well as thermal sights and trucks. 

Sweden is to donate Tridon Mk 2 anti-aircraft gun systems and RBS 70 MANPADS under a new aid package announced on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to an article written by Ulf Kristersson, Sweden’s Prime Minister and published by SvD Debatte on 23rd February. Unlike much of the previously donated Swedish equipment, these new systems have been procured directly from the manufacturers to be delivered to Ukraine, rather than being pulled from Sweden’s existing stocks. Germany’s Free Democratic Party has filed a motion to the Bundestag on the 29th January requesting that the government push a EUR3 billion aid package through without a vote, as much of it is supposed to support Ukraine’s air defences, and Ukraine’s MoD did report that Germany was providing 100 additional missiles for the IRIS-T air defence system on the 13th February, indicating that Germany will make a significant contribution to Ukraine’s air defence in the coming year. 

Both the Gravehawk and Tridon Mk 2 employ existing systems to some extent and stocks of ammunition to provide improved air defence capabilities against targets like cruise missiles and Shahed strike drones. While they do not provide a response to the threat of ballistic missiles, which are arguably the most challenging weapon deployed by Russian forces, they do help to provide mass and an alternative supply of interceptors, which is needed to counter large waves of drones and cruise missiles. 

Tech profile: Tridon Mk 2

Tridon Mk 2 is an interesting system from BAE that leverages the family of Bofors 40 mm Mk 4 cannons that are often used to arm ships. It was developed and unveiled in 2024 having been tested on ‘Shahed-like targets,’ BAE said at the time. The 40 mm cannon is mounted in a 2,300 kg cupola that can be installed onto the chassis of a truck or armoured vehicle. The cannon has a rate of fire of 300 rounds per minute that can be adjusted if required, and an average engagement consumes 5 – 10 rounds. The gun is fed from a primary magazine of 30 rounds supported by a secondary magazine of 70 rounds. It fires the Bofors family of 3P (Pre-fragmented, Programmable, Proximity- fuzed) ammunition, which can be programmed to perform in six different modes including airburst, impact, and proximity. Tridon carries its own sight from Chess Dynamics and can be integrated with a Saab Giraffe radar. 

Calibre comment

European states and Canada have pledged billions in support for Ukraine since the start of 2025 with many reaffirming their commitment to supporting the country for as long as it takes. This is encouraging in the light of many political changes in Europe and the US. The support offered, where details are available, appears to be valuable and focused on those areas that defence analysts have recommended. Together with deliveries of vehicles and munitions for which production started in 2023 and 2024, Ukraine should see a modest influx of equipment and support over 2025 that will go some of the way to replenishing its frontline forces. A recent reorganisation of the Ukrainian armed forces has also stabilised the frontline to some extent, according to the Ukrainian MoD. 

However, Russia is rebuilding a firepower advantage along its main lines of effort in Ukraine, and will continue to gradually take ground and inflict losses. Its own defence industry is expanding and developing new capabilities to meet the demands of the war, and its soldiers are growing more experienced in the styles of combat that breed success in Ukraine. However, its losses in both personnel and equipment are high. Whether or not they are sustainable for Russia is unclear, the question is probably more about how willing the Kremlin is to force the matter upon the population. Russia’s inability to organise and conduct combined arms manoeuvres with a mass of competent infantry forces are one of the few saving graces for Ukraine. It means that Russia is unable to exploit Ukraine’s vulnerabilities to the fullest extent, which has allowed time for European support to fall into place for the coming year. This, combined with the potential US support upon the signing of the minerals deal, may mean that neither side is able to achieve the type of gains that will significantly alter the course of the war militarily in the next 10 months. Ultimately, as perhaps has always been the case, much will rest on negotiations when they eventually happen. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on 26th February 2025.