Russian FPV drone tactics 

Some information on the way that Russian units employ first person view (FPV) drones has been provided by a social media account called Unfair Advantage, which provides advice to Russian soldiers on fighting in Ukraine. 

A post published by the account on the 20th February provides an insight into the use of FPV drones to replicate the effects of artillery during offensive operations. Lacking ammunition for massed fires against a given point, Russian infantry have taken to carrying FPV drones forward with them and preparing them for use once within striking distance of the Ukrainian position. 

At that point, the FPV drones are activated and controlled, “from afar, [by drone operators] from their positions located in the depths,” the account states, adding that they use directional antennas which provide the range necessary for this type of control. 

Typically, the impact of FPVs is limited by their battery life, which is measured in minutes and allows for a relatively short range and time over the target. If, however, the FPV drones can be brought close to the target before activated, they will have greater battery life and time for the operators to find a target. 

Once airborne, the FPV drones are used to conduct multiple successive strikes against the Ukrainian position with the goal of getting them close together, thereby preventing the Ukrainians from emerging to engage the approaching Russian infantry. The account states that an assault unit can carry at least 20 FPV drones with them for this type of attack. 

In other cases covered in an earlier Calibre article, there are instances of Russians and Ukrainians deploying FPV drones to the rear of the frontline and waiting by a road for a target vehicle to pass by. The drone is activated at that point and conducts an engagement, this saves battery as the drone does not have to fly looking for a target. This approach can also be used against bunkers and trenches, according to Unfair Advantage. 

The greater range offered by fibre optic FPV drones is also used to locate and interdict Ukrainian logistics routes that lead into areas that the Russian troops are working to take. This aims to prevent them from receiving supplies and further degrade their morale in the hope that then concentrating FPVs on the remaining defenders will enable a breakthrough. 

It’s important to place the FPV drone tactics in the context of how Russia conducts infantry assaults. Small units are typically infiltrated forwards to converge on a given point. An initial unit will be pushed into an offensive to reveal Ukrainian positions, they will be followed by another and another allowing positions to be identified and destroyed. They occasionally receive support from armoured vehicles and artillery, but are primarily left to conduct the offensive independently. 

Tech profile: The counter-FPV fight

It also appears that approaches to countering FPVs and drones are consolidating around a core set of capabilities. The first element is detection with forces on both sides deploying spectrum analysers that provide a warning or indication if radio frequency signals in a given frequency are detected. This may be paired with a video monitor which can automatically intercept an FPV drone’s video feed and display it to the user on a screen. This allows the user to determine what the FPV is being used to target and move into cover or try to escape if necessary. 

Interception revolves around several capabilities starting with jamming. Jamming is broadly straightforward against the satellite navigation channel of an FPV or drone if it relies on it. This is because the signals are coming from space and are relatively weak once they reach earth, which means that broad spectrum and wide area jamming can disrupt drone flight over a wide area. However, video and control link signals can be more resistant to jamming and require a more tailored and focused approach. This is complicated by both sides changing the control frequencies of their drones every few weeks. One jammer that is believed to be used by Russian forces is the Harpy CKJ-1704 backpack drone jammer.  The Harpy is designed to suppress drone signals over a radius of 2,000 m and can provide up to four hours of continuous jamming. It is claimed to provide a 300 W output and to be effective against frequencies between 430 and 960 MHz.

However, jamming has no effect against fibre optic FPV drones, making kinetic effects the only response. 12 gauge shotguns are becoming more common for both sides and assault rifles are used in a worst case scenario. North Korean troops were reportedly taught to operate in a group of three; one soldier would run to draw the FPV drone out, and the other two would shoot at it. It is common for vehicles on the move to carry at least one soldier armed with a shotgun ready to engage FPVs that are tracking the vehicle. 

A report published by a Russian news outlet indicates that some training is also provided by the Russian MoD in using shotguns to counter FPV drones. The feature showed Anna Taranosova, a Russian shooting champion, providing training for soldiers on a variety of 12 gauge shotguns including sporting weapons as well as what appeared to be the SAIGA 12 semi-automatic shotguns, which have a large magazine capacity. 

Calibre comment

The role of FPV drones in shaping the war in Ukraine is difficult to properly assess. They have become an important form of lethality for both sides, but often because the access to artillery ammunition has been insufficient to meet the doctrinal needs of either force. It is therefore difficult to deduce the extent to which the use of small drones that are often built by the units that use them will shape Russian forces after the war. 

It is clear, however, with FPV drone attacks proliferating in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere in the world, that western forces will have to develop counters to this type of drone and invest in the capabilities necessary to protect their forces. This may, or may not, look like the solutions adopted by Russian and Ukrainian units. But there are certainly lessons to be learned from the war about best practices.

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on 21st February, 2025.